https://library.icmglt.org/files/original/3784c73528fb2f3927f554ae4df5b049.png aef16f910c2e17822ab852c3e0a0faff Electronic Resource View Source <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.7466396">https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.7466396</a> Document Type Journal article Author(s) Robert Axelrod, William D. Hamilton Volume Vol. 211 Issue No. 4489 Journal Name Science Publication Date 1981 Language English Access Restricted Access Abstract Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease. Cataloger Kristen Walker Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Evolution of Cooperation Subject The topic of the resource Biology Cooperation in Organisms Evolutionary Theory Prisoner's Dilemma Game